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which remittance flows are high. Our results suggest that there is no single model to rate countries and the
impact of remittances on ratings is enhanced for small, low and middle income economies.
rodu
d
h
s
s
RSovereign ratings;
Emerging markets;
Sovereign risk
© 2010 P
1. Introduction
Research on the access of sovereigns to international capital mar-
kets suggests that sovereign creditworthiness could be improved by
including remittance flows in key indebtedness indicators, such as∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 1 45241820.
E-mail addresses: rolando.avendano@oecd.org
(R. Avendano), ngaillard@worldbank.org (N. Gaillard),
sebastian.NIETOPARRA@oecd.org (S. Nieto-Parra).
1879-9337 © 2010 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of
Africagrowth Institute.
Peer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute, Republic of
South Africa.
doi:10.1016/j.rdf.2010.10.003
Production and hosting by Elsevier
a
i
s
i
r
t
t
h
fl
m
a
a
2
(
t
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
ebt-to-exports and debt service to current account ratios. These
ave been identified in the literature as common determinants of
overeign ratings (Ratha, 2005; World Bank, 2006).
Two series of surveys at the crossroads of the literature on
overeign ratings and remittance flows are worth mentioning. First,
atha et al. (2007) define a standard ratings model and find that
number of unrated countries would be likely to have higher rat-
ngs than expected, notably on account of foreign currency inflows
uch as remittances. According to Ratha (2005), “country credit rat-
ngs by major international rating agencies often fail to account for
emittances”. Second, rating agencies note in their country studies
hat remittances matter to determine ratings for countries in which
hese flows are considerable. At a time when economic growth was
igh, Fitch – Fitch Ratings – (2008a) underlined that remittance
ows could positively impact ratings (e.g., El Salvador). Fitch com-
ents are consistent with its sovereign methodology that “takes into
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ccount the volatility and potential vulnerability of receipts, such
s remittances, to domestic and external shocks” (Fitch Ratings,
007). In its outlook for Mexico, S&P – Standard and Poor’s –
2005) stressed remittances’ importance as an income source for
he balance of payments, and their impact on other determinants
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f sovereign ratings, such as public finances. In May 2009, S&P
owered El Salvador’s credit rating to “BB” from “BB+”, stating
hat “the weak performance in 2009 is due to falling consumption,
nvestments, and exports as a result of a significant pass-through
rom the global recession” and that “remittances from the United
tates fell by 8 per cent in the first two months of the year”.1 In
he same way, in February 2009, Moody’s – Moody’s Investors Ser-
ice – highlighted that, for a country like the Philippines, a slower
conomic growth for 2009 would also be explained by a decline in
emittances, which account for more than 10 per cent of domestic
utput and are a major driver of consumption.2
Despite these stylised facts, little research has been devoted
o analyse the impact that remittances have on sovereign ratings
ssigned by credit rating agencies (CRAs). Our paper attempts to
ddress this issue by building a rating model over a long time span
1993–2006), and estimating the ratings of the three main CRAs for
sample of 55 emerging countries. This study aims at answering
our key questions: how can we capture the effect of remittances
n ratings? Do rating agencies really take remittances fully into
ccount in their analyses? What is the potential effect of remit-
ances when included in market variable estimations? And finally,
hat is the “shadow rating” for unrated countries highly dependent
n remittances?
This issue is crucial given the importance of remittance flows
owards the developing world. In order to capture the effects of
emittances, we focus on the country’s Balance of Payments, which
s part of any government’s financial strength (see Moody’s Investors
ervice, 2008a for the importance of balance of payment consider-
tions in determining ratings). First, we analyse a common channel
o measure the importance of remittances in sovereign risk assess-
ent (Ratha, 2005; World Bank, 2006). We wonder to what extent
emittances can contribute to improve sovereign ratings when they
re included in a traditional solvency ratio (i.e., the debt to exports
f goods and services ratio). Second, we introduce the volatility of
xternal flows (FDI flows, portfolio flows, ODA, bank loans, exports
nd remittances) as an additional variable explaining sovereign rat-
ngs. These flows are particularly important for developing and
merging economies, where saving rates are low and dependence
n external financing is high. Migrants’ remittances are considered
stable source of financing compared with other financial flows
Ratha, 2004).3 Remittances, in the same way as foreign investment
r exports, are important items in the balance of payments, con-
ributing to mitigate credit risk at the country level. More precisely,
emittances strengthen financial stability by reducing the probability
f current account reversals (Bugamelli and Paterno, 2005). This,
n turn, can be related to the probability of default studied in coun-
ry risk models. Besides, remittances can have a countercyclical
ffect in some emerging economies, significantly reducing growth
olatility (Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2007).4 Of course, as pointed by
1
“S&P lowers El Salvador rating to ‘BB’ from ‘BB+”’, Reuters, May 12,
009 (online article).
2
“Moody’s: Slowing remittances hurt RP”, Manila Bulletin, February 14,
009 (online article).
3 See Esteves and Khoudour-Casteras (2009) for similar findings regarding
he late 19th century in Europe.
4 However, as pointed out elsewhere, migrant-based income can become
ostly to emerging countries when resources are mismanaged. Remittances
ay reduce the government’s incentive to maintain fiscal policy discipline
Chami et al., 2008). Moreover, this dependence raises a moral hazard prob-
em by reducing the political will to implement reforms and pushing real
xchange appreciation. These findings are consistent with Amuedo-Dorantes
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he report Close to Home, the comprehensive World Bank study
n Latin America, remittances are an engine for development, but
hey are neither “manna from heaven” nor a substitute for sound
evelopment policies.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2
rovides a review of the literature on sovereign ratings and in partic-
lar on the relevance of sovereign ratings for emerging economies
s well as the determinants of these ratings. Section 3 presents the
ost important stylised facts and analyses the results of the econo-
etric model. In particular, this section emphasizes the impact of
emittance flows on ratings. We also provide an empirical analysis
or countries with a high share of remittances (as a percentage of
DP). Finally, Section 4 provides concluding remarks and sketches
he major policy implications that follow from this research.
. Review of the literature
wo dimensions are related to the analysis of rating agencies. The
rst considers the impact of ratings on capital markets. The second,
haracterised by a vast and relevant literature, studies the determi-
ants of ratings. This section presents that literature and can be
mitted by a familiar reader.
Focusing on the impact on capital markets, Kaminsky and
chmukler (2001) find that downgrades and upgrades have an
mpact on country risk and stock returns: these rating changes are
ransmitted across countries, with neighbour-country effects being
ore significant. They conclude that rating agencies may contribute
o heighten financial instability. The study of sovereign risk assess-
ent has mainly focused on comparing ratings to market spreads.
or the period 1987–1994, Cantor and Packer (1996) find a greater
mpact on spreads from a rating change in the case of Moody’s or if
t is related to speculative-grade countries. Reisen and Von Maltzan
1999) show that, during the period 1989–1997, Fitch, Moody’s
nd S&P downgrades have a significant impact on spreads, contrary
o upgrades, which were anticipated by the market. Sovereign rat-
ngs have the potential to moderate euphoria among investors on
merging markets but rating agencies failed to exploit that potential
n the 1990s. Sy (2001) highlights the strong negative relationship
etween ratings and EMBI+ spreads declines during periods of high
isk aversion. Mora (2006) examines Moody’s and S&P ratings and
oncludes that the procyclicality of ratings is not ascertained when
onsidering the post Asian crisis years. Analysing sovereign ratings
ssued by the three agencies for 1993–2007, Gaillard (2009) finds
hat the procyclicality of ratings was much sharper during periods
f high risk aversion (1997–1998 in particular) than periods of low
isk aversion (2005–2007). He also highlights the greater stability
f Moody’s ratings. In a different way, Cavallo et al. (2008) develop
simple Hausman specification test and find that there is some
nformational content in sovereign ratings that is not completely
aptured by market spreads. Additional tests reinforce their conclu-
ion that ratings matter. Lastly, going beyond the traditional “ratings
s. spreads” view, Roubini and Manasse (2005) present an original
overeign risk assessment methodology by using a binary recursive
ree. With this approach, they discuss appropriate policy options to
revent crises. A key result that follows from this research is that
atings do matter and they are an important piece to understand the
ehaviour of capital markets.
nd Pozo (2004) who relate higher remittance flows to the reduction of the
eceiving country’s competitiveness.
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Table 1 Summary of models and variables.
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Cantor and Packer 1996 1995 • • • • • • • • •
Rowland and Torres 2004 1987-2001 • • • • • • • • •
Sutton 2005 2004 • • • • • • • •
Mora 2006 1986-2001 • • • • • • • • •
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the different rating models. In particular, exports data come from
the Global Development Finance (GDF) and workers’ remittances
come from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).6
5 The exchange rate is not directly studied in the standard models of
sovereign ratings. However, balance of payments’ variables (which affectOur model 2009 1993-2006 • • • • •
Source: Authors based on Cantor and Packer (1996), Rowland and Torres
The literature focusing on sovereign ratings methodology has
expanded since the mid 1990s. Cantor and Packer (1996) identify
five variables that may explain S&P and Moody’s sovereign ratings:
per capita income, inflation, external debt ratio, the indicator for eco-
nomic development and the default history. Juttner and McCarthy
(2000) show that Cantor and Packer’s model becomes less accu-
rate after the Asian crisis. They suggest that the determinants of
1998 ratings are the current account balance, the indicators for eco-
nomic development and default history, the interest rate differential
vis-à-vis the USD, and the range of problematic assets. Never-
theless, several follow-up studies corroborate Cantor and Packer’s
results. For Afonso (2003), the most significant variables for 2002
ratings (per capita income, inflation, indicators for economic devel-
opment and default history) are already determinants for Cantor and
Packer. Moody’s own study (Moody’s Investors Service, 2004) pro-
duces a similar finding: two of their four explanatory variables (per
capita GDP and external debt) are the same as Cantor and Packer’s.
Moody’s main finding is the incorporation of a political variable that
significantly improves the model. For Rowland (2005), the level
of international reserves as a share of GDP, and the openness of
the economy are additional relevant determinants. Sutton’s (2005)
findings are consistent with previous papers. He also considers the
maturity structure of international banking claims against both pri-
vate and public sector entities in the country as a significant variable.
3. Empirical strategy
3.1. Data description
The literature on the determinants on sovereign ratings is extensive.
We focus on the most representative work to identify the variables
considered by agencies when assigning a rating to public borrowers.
The traditional approach in the literature has consisted in regress-
ing the dependent variable (i.e., sovereign rating) on a series of
macroeconomic and institutional indicators.
Table 1 summarizes the period and variables used by Cantor
and Packer (1996), Rowland and Torres (2004), Sutton (2005) and
t
i
T
t• • • • • •
), Sutton (2005) and Mora (2006).
ora (2006) to analyse the determinants of sovereign ratings. All
hese articles study the solvency ratio as a determinant of sovereign
atings the solvency ratio (i.e., external debt over exports), a key
ariable in our analysis. Whereas Cantor and Packer’s and Sutton’s
nalyses are based on a cross-country study, Rowland and Torres
nd Mora use panel data to estimate rating determinants. Most of
hese studies use one or more of the available ratings published by
he three main rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and
itch. Table 1 compares the variables in our model with those used
n previous rating models.
The results presented in Table 1 are straightforward. Sovereign
atings are associated to a country’s fundamentals and, in contrast
ith sovereign spreads (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000), only domes-
ic factors are analysed. More precisely, macroeconomic conditions
e.g., inflation rate, GDP growth), solvency ratios (e.g., external
ebt over exports, external debt service over GDP) and structural
spects (e.g., GDP per capita, economic development) are employed
s determinants of sovereign ratings.5
We use data on ratings from the three main rating agencies:
tandard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. The covered period is
993–2006, the frequency is annual and the initial sample includes
5 rated countries (excluding high income countries according to
orld Bank’s definition). Ratings are transformed linearly (Table 2).
Macroeconomic data come from the World Development Indica-
ors and the International Financial Statistics. The source of national
ebt data is the Global Development Finance (World Bank). Table 3
rovides a résumé of the main macroeconomic variables used acrosshe exchange rate) are studied as determinants of sovereign ratings.
6 Data on exports from the Global Development Finance (GDF) also
nclude total workers’ remittances registered in the Balance of Payments.
he GDF defines Exports of Goods, Services and Income (XGS) as the
otal value of goods and services exported, and receipts of compensation
60 R. Avendano et al.
Table 2 Linear transformation of ratings.
S&P Moody’s Fitch Linear transformation
AAA Aaa AAA 21
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 20
AA Aa2 AA 19
AA− Aa3 AA− 18
A+ A1 A+ 17
A A2 A 16
A− A3 A− 15
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 14
BBB Baa2 BBB 13
BBB− Baa3 BBB- 12
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 11
BB Ba2 BB 10
BB− Ba3 BB− 9
B+ B1 B+ 8
B B2 B 7
B− B3 B− 6
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 5
CCC Caa2 CCC 4
CCC− Caa3 CCC− 3
CC and C Ca CC and C 2
SD and D C DDD, DD and D 1
nd Pa
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nonlinear transformation of ratings. Their nonlinear transformation was ba
be implemented in our sample, due to the lack of data for several countrie
.2. Testing previous models for sovereign ratings: the effect of
emittances
e first test the four representative models proposed in the litera-
ure. This research has used the solvency ratio (i.e., total external
ebt-to-exports ratio) as a key variable to explain sovereign ratings.
e intend to identify the most relevant determinants of ratings. In
ontrast to previous studies, our sample includes a large number of
ountries and covers a 14-year period. We run OLS and fixed-effect
anel data regressions, using the sovereign rating of the three rating
gencies as the dependent variable.7
Moreover, we are interested in analysing the impact of remit-
ances on rating agencies. As presented, remittance flows can be
hock absorbers for the economy and play a role in reducing the
ountry’s vulnerability. More generally, remittances can improve
reditworthiness and thereby facilitate access to international capital
arkets.
f employees, and investment income. In order to calculate our solvency
atio we first exclude workers’ remittances and compensation of employ-
es from the XGS variable (solvency ratio without remittances) and then
e include workers’ remittances (from the IFS) in the denominator of the
olvency ratio (solvency ratio with remittances). Workers’ remittances, a
ransfer and not an income entry in the balance of payments, are treated
s compensation of employees in GDF because they are often uneasy to
istinguish from compensation of non-resident workers and migrants. We
herefore have usually workers’ remittances and compensation of employ-
es contained in the Export series. Workers’ remittances and compensation
f employees comprise current transfers by migrant workers, wages and
alaries earned by non-resident workers. In addition, migrants’ transfers, a
art of capital transfers, are treated as workers’ remittances in GDF. We
herefore restrict our analysis to the series of “workers remittances”, and
xclude compensation of employees and migrants’ transfers (as estimated
y GDF database).
7 OLS estimations are not reported but can be provided upon request.
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tcker, 1996; Gaillard, 2009). Ferri et al. (1999) used both a linear and a
n secondary market interest rate spreads. Such a transformation could not
We introduce remittances in the solvency ratio’s denominator
o capture the entire effect of the current account incomes, as our
econd core variable (i.e., volatility of external flows) is not stud-
ed in the literature. These revenues in the balance of payments
ay serve as a cushion against external shocks and then reduce
he risk of default on external debt. In fact, since we are interested
n the country’s capacity to pay the entire total external debt (pri-
ate and public), it is relevant to include remittances in this ratio
o capture total incomes received by nationals in the balance of
ayments.
We concentrate our analysis on Latin America and the Caribbean
ountries, where remittances reach high levels both in absolute (e.g.,
exico, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Dominican
epublic, and Ecuador) and relative values (e.g., Guyana, Honduras,
aiti, Jamaica, and El Salvador).8 Avendano, Gaillard and Nieto-
arra (2009) show the evolution of our solvency ratio for Latin
merican and Caribbean countries, where the relative impact of
emittances in debt indicators remains heterogeneous. In general, the
ffect of remittances is higher in Central American and Caribbean
ountries (e.g., Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
amaica) than in other countries of the region (e.g., Argentina,
razil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela).
Following the literature review, we test our hypothesis on a group
f models on sovereign ratings. Annex 1a–c summarises results of
our representative models (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Rowland and
orres, 2004; Sutton, 2005; Mora, 2006), for the three agencies
ver the period 1993–2006. To quantify the impact of remittances
n sovereign ratings, we test these standard models for ratings by
xcluding/including the flow of remittances in the external debt to
xports ratio. More precisely, we use both ratios, total debt over
xports of goods and services, and workers’ remittances (TDX) and
otal debt over exports of goods and services (TDX wr).
8 OECD (2009).
Are working remittances relevant for creditrating agencies? 61
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for variables (1993–2006).
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Bank capital to assets ratio (%) 391 10.41 3.90
Bank nonperfoming loans to total gross loans (%) 422 10.43 8.36
Changes in net reserves (BoP, current US$) 1441 −1.85E+09 1.26E+10
Consumer price index (2000 = 100) 1497 87.19 54.12
Current account balance (% of GDP) 1437 −3.53 −7.88
Current account balance (BoP, current US$) 1441 2.39E+08 1.05E+10
Export quantum/quantity index (2000 = 100) 1179 94.06 51.81
Exports of goods and services (BoP, current US$) 1441 1.95E+10 5.54E+10
Exports of goods, services and income (BoP, current US$ 1441 2.05E+10 5.80E+10
Fiscal budget 858 −2.45 4.32
Foreign direct investment, net (BoP, current US$) 1419 1.50E+09 5.16E+09
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 1463 3.35 10.48
GDP (constant 2000 US$) 1655 6.62E+10 1.73E+11
GDP (current US$) 1661 7.13E+10 2.01E+11
GDP growth (annual %) 1649 3.78 6.39
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 1655 1904.60 1673.77
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 1636 4154.62 3159.79
Gross National Product 1483 6.84E+10 1.81E+11
Import value index (2000 = 100) 1284 95.04 48.91
Imports of goods and services (BoP, current US$) 1441 1.89E+10 4.85E+10
Imports of goods, services and income (BoP, current US$ 1441 2.14E+10 5.26E+10
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 1475 52.26 337.73
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 1642 86.95 642.41
Net capital account (BoP, current US$) 1073 8.98E+07 9.64E+08
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) 1590 503.81 1759.69
Ratings Fitch 485 9.73 3.01
Ratings Moody’s 603 9.97 3.32
Ratings S&P 614 9.74 2.98
Real effective exchange rate index (2000 = 100) 772 4489.06 121757.5
Risk premium on lending (%) 562 8.09 14.34
S&P/EMDB indexes (annual % change) 425 18.54 47.35
Solvency ratio (debt/exports) 1261 240.96 321.08
Solvency ratio (debt/exports) excl. remittances 1340 247.54 319.72
Total reserves (% of external debt) 1408 46.78 125.92
Total reserves (includes gold, current US$) 1545 1.13E+10 6.08E+10
Total reserves in months of imports 1412 3.93 3.11
Total reserves minus gold (current US$) 1545 1.07E+10 6.00E+10
Volatility of external flows (excl. remittances) 1150 0.00 0.03
Volatility of external flows (incl. remittances) 1150 0.00 0.03
Volatility of GDP growth 1378 3.49 4.02
Workers remittances/GDP 1072 0.04 0.05
ternat
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3Workers’ remittances, receipts (BoP, current US$)
Sources: Global Development Finance, World Development Indicators, In
Service (2009), S&P (2009).
Results in Annex 1a–c show that, for most models, the ratio debt
over exports (with or without remittances) is negative and signifi-
cant for the three agencies.9 Indeed, it is a key and relevant variable
explaining sovereign ratings. For instance, taking Cantor and Packer
(1996) model, columns 1–6 in Annex 1a show that the foreign cur-
rency debt to exports ratio is statistically significant at 1 per cent
and negatively correlated with sovereign ratings.
In addition to this ratio, other variables are crucial to explain
ratings: GDP per capita, inflation rate, the historical default and
the institutional stability (see Cantor and Packer, 1996; Moody’s
Investors Service, 2004). Finally, there is no impact on all rating
models predicted when including or excluding remittances on the
solvency ratio.
9 The exception is the estimation of Fitch ratings by Mora (2006).
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fl1076 1.03E+09 2.37E+09
ional Financial Statistics, 2009; Fitch Ratings (2009), Moody’s Investors
These results suggest that the impact of workers’ remittances
n CRAs’ sovereign methodologies is small. Indeed, an inclusion
f remittances implies a reduction of the solvency ratio and conse-
uently a higher coefficient (in absolute value) can then compensate
or the “remittances effect” in the sovereign rating. This finding is
xplained empirically for our general model.
.3. Proposing a general model and testing remittances effect
raditional models on the determinants of ratings include a sol-
ency indicator, such as the debt to exports ratio. By introducing
emittance flows (as suggested by Ratha, 2005), we have tested if
hey play a role in reducing external vulnerabilities. In addition, we
ntroduce a consistent explanatory variable for sovereign ratings in
hich remittances can play a crucial role: the volatility of external
ows.
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variable used to explain the impact of remittances on ratings (i.e.,
the solvency ratio), the new variable introduced (i.e., the volatility
indicator) helps to explain ratings. The variable default is negatively
correlated to the sovereign rating, as expected, and is significant for
10 As for the case of the models presented above, we build an artificial ratio
by subtracting the total amount of Workers’ Remittances from the variable
Total Exports, and we name it TDX wr, this is, the debt to exports ratio
excluding workers’ remittances. Again, the coefficients for the variable Total
Debt/Exports with and without remittances are very similar. To analyse the
impact of remittances through the volatility of external flows, we subtract
Workers’ Remittances to the calculation of the volatility of external flows,
and we name it Volat indicator wr, this is, the volatility of external flows
by excluding workers’ remittances. A coefficient test shows that they are not
significantly different from the previous regression.
11 A complementary approach consists in defining a variable taking the
difference between the two solvency ratios and volatilities of external flows,
this is: Δ1 =
[
Debt
Exports
]
−
[
Debt
Exports+remittances
]
and Δ2 = Volatwith remit −
Volatwithout remit , and test for the significance of these variables in the gen-
eral model. For 1, when including it in the model together with the ratio
debt over exports it is significant at 1%, but it becomes non-significant when
excluding the ratio. 2 is not significant in the model at 5% level (except2
When compared to other external flows (i.e., exports, portfolio
ows, FDI flows, ODA), remittances display a much lower volatility
nd lower correlation to these flows (see OECD, 2009 for Latin
merican countries); they can act as a cushion vis-à-vis capital
ights. We assess the volatility of external flows as a second channel
hrough which remittance flows are likely to affect sovereign ratings.
ur hypothesis is that remittances can reduce the total volatility
f inward external flows, which is itself a powerful explanatory
ariable for sovereign ratings.
We use the variance as a measure of external flows volatility. We
ecompose the variance of inward external flows as follows:
Var(external flows)α,t
=
N∑
i=1
w2i,t · Var(Xi,t) + 2
N∑
i /= j
wi,twj,tCov(Xi,t, Xj,t) (I)
here N is the number of inward external flows,
ar(external flows)α,t corresponds to the variance of inward
xternal flows of country α at year t, wi,t is the weight of the
xternal flow i with respect to the total external flows in country
, Var(Xi,t) is the variance of the external flow i as a share of GDP
etween t − 4 and t, Cov(Xi,t, Xj,t) is the covariance between the
xternal flows over GDP i and j and from t − 4 to t.
Fig. 1a and b presents the volatility of external flows by including
nd excluding remittances (see Avendano et al. (2009) for the evolu-
ion of the volatility of external flows for Latin American countries
uring 1993–2007). There is a considerable reduction of external
ows volatility for some South and Central American countries with
igh levels of remittances over GDP (i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala,
ominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras and Colombia).
Considering the results from the four standard models and our
ew volatility indicator presented above, we use the following model
or our analysis (we name it General Model):
atingi,t = β0 + β1GDP pc + β2GDP growthi,t + β3Inflati,t
+β4Fisc budgi,t + β5CAi,t + β6TDXi,t
+β7Defaulti,t + β8Reservesi,t + β9Volat indicatori,t
+β10EMBIi,t + τt + εi,t (II)
here Ratingi,t corresponds to the transformed rating of country i
t time t (see Table 2), GDP pc is the GDP per capita in current
nternational dollars, GDP growth is the product’s growth, Inflat
orresponds to annual inflation, Fisc budg is the annual balance
udget as a share of GDP, CA is the current account balance (as a
hare of GDP), TDX is the ratio of total debt to exports, Default is
dummy variable for countries taking value 1 for countries hav-
ng experienced a default during the previous 20 years, Reserves is
he ratio of reserves to GDP, Volat indicator is the external flows
olatility, EMBI is a dummy variable for those countries covered by
he Bond Index calculated by JP Morgan, τ t is a year fixed effect and
i,t is an error term. Within this setup, β6 and β9 measure the elastic-
ty of sovereign ratings with respect to the debt to exports ratio and
he external flows volatility respectively, after controlling for all the
ther factors. The term τ t captures differences in sovereign rating
cross time not explained by the other determinants.
In this model, we are mainly interested in the variables affected
y remittance flows, particularly the volatility indicator (i.e., the
olatility of inward external flows) and the solvency ratio (i.e.,
f
b
i
b
b
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he debt to exports ratio).10 Tables 4a and 4b show the results for
ur general model and the three rating agencies. We run OLS and
xed-effect panel data regressions, using the sovereign rating as the
ependent variable and the volatility of flows and solvency ratio
including and excluding remittances) as explanatory variables.11
irst, we run regressions including remittance flows (columns i, iii
nd v of Tables 4a and 4b) and exposed in equation II. Second,
e run regressions excluding remittance flows (columns ii, iv and
i of Tables 4a and 4b). With this setup, regressions are estimated
rom equation II but excluding remittance flows from the volatility
ndicator (Volat indicator wr) and the solvency ratio (TDX wr).
Results on OLS and Fixed Effect Estimations do not vary
onsiderably.12 We describe only the results for the fixed effect esti-
ation with time effect. First, we analyse the regressions including
emittances in the volatility of external flows as well as in the sol-
ency ratio. Not surprisingly, regressions (i), (iii) and (v) in Table 4b
eveal that GDP per capita is positive and significant at the 1 per cent
evel. GDP growth, on the contrary, is not significant for our sample
nd is negatively correlated with ratings (the exception being for
oody’s). A higher inflation is related to a lower rating but this
esult is only significant for S&P. The fiscal budget over GDP is
egative and significant for Fitch. The current account ratio is neg-
tively significant for the three rating agencies. Although this result
ould be unexpected, it is not uncommon in the literature (Cantor
nd Packer, 1996; Mora, 2006), and revisits the debate on whether
urrent account deficits display strengths or weaknesses the coun-
ry’s economic performance. As stated by Mora (2006), better rated
ountries are able to run current account deficits and borrow more
asily from abroad; therefore a deficit could be seen as a sign of
trength (regardless of whether it is because they are rated higher
r whether the higher rating is correlated with factors that allow
he country to run deficits). Both the debt to exports ratio and the
xternal flows volatility variable are consistently negative and sig-
ificant for all rating agencies. Indeed, additionally to the standardor Fitch).
12 We check for the presence of multicollinearity in the general model
y computing the variance inflation factors. The tolerance for all variables
ncluded in the model was close to 1, confirming the absence of collinearity
etween regressors. As a robustness check, we also estimate correlations
etween fixed effects and country ratings. We find a correlation of 0.25 for
&P, 0.30 for Moody’s and 0.24 for Fitch.
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sFigure 1 (a) Average volatility of external flows with and without w
excluding remittances. Average 1993–2007.
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on Global Development Finance an
S&P. The reserves-to-GDP ratio is positively related to S&P and
Moody’s ratings, highlighting the increasing role of precautionary
reserves for impeding defaults. Regressions (ii), (iv) and (vi) con-
sider the new variables excluding remittances from both the debt to
exports ratio and the external flows volatility variable: they show
very similar results.
3.4. Counterfactual analysis for Latin America – General Model
To assess the potential effect that the solvency ratio and the volatil-
ity indicator could have on ratings for Latin American countries,
we construct a counterfactual scenario, looking at changes in the
rating when remittance flows are taken into account. First, we
use the estimation obtained from equation II excluding remittance
flows from the volatility indicator (Volat indicator wr) and the sol-
vency ratio (TDX wr). From this estimation we obtain the vector
ˆβ as the fixed-effect estimator. Then, we use the observed debt to
exports ratio (TDX) as well as the external flows volatility variable
(volat indicator) and calculate the change in the rating using both
variables and the ˆβ coefficients. We obtain the potential improve-
ment in the sovereign ratings for the Latin American countries
d
w
(
trs’ remittances. Average 1993–2007. (b) Percent change on volatility
ernational Financial Statistics, 2009.
ncluded in the sample. Annexes 2a–c depict: (i) the observed rat-
ng for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively (“Observed” Y in the
gures); (ii) the predicted rating (“Predicted” ˆY in the figures) esti-
ated taking into account the TDX wr ratio (debt to exports ratio
xcluding remittances) and the volat indicator wr ratio (volatility
f external flows excluding remittances); (iii) the counterfactual rat-
ng in the scenario including workers’ remittances in our variable
f interests, debt/exports and volatility of external flows (“Counter-
actual” ˜Y in the figures).
Fig. 2 compares three types of ratings for a set of Latin American
nd Caribbean countries: the observed rating, the predicted rating
estimated from a model excluding remittances from the solvency
atio and from the external flows volatility) and the counterfac-
ual rating (calculated from the estimators of the predicted model
nd by including remittances in the two core explanatory variables:
olvency ratio and volatility of external flows).Fig. 2 presents the ratings assigned by Fitch, Moody’s and Stan-
ard and Poor’s in 2006. For instance, by analysing the case of S&P,
e note that for countries with high levels of remittances over GDP
e.g., El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador and Dominican Republic),
here is a relative high difference between the predicted rating and
64
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Table 4a General model – OLS estimation with time effect.
S&P Moodys Fitch
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
With remittances ME Without remittances ME With remittances ME Without remittances ME With remittances ME Without remittances ME
GDP per capital (PPP) 0.000*** [0.000] 1.649 0.000*** [0.000] 1.649 0.000*** [0.000] 2.062 0.000*** [0.000] 1.649 0.000*** [0.000] 1.649 0.000*** [0.000] 1.649
GDP growth (annual) 0.029 [0.031] 0.111 0.026 [0.030] 0.099 0.051* [0.028] 0.192 0.039 [0.027] 0.149 0.035 [0.033] 0.131 0.030 [0.032] 0.113
Annual inflation −0.002** [0.001] −0.107 −0.002** [0.001] −0.107 −0.001 [0.001] −0.034 −0.001 [0.001] −0.039 −0.002 [0.001] −0.119 −0.002* [0.001] −0.117
Fiscal Budget 0.047 [0.034] −0.114 0.028 [0.033] −0.068 −0.097*** [0.035] 0.237 −0.082** [0.034] 0.201 −0.009 [0.043] 0.021 −0.015 [0.041] 0.038
Current account (%
GDP)
−0.190*** [0.023] 0.672 −0.185*** [0.021] 0.656 −0.136*** [0.021] 0.483 −0.154*** [0.020] 0.547 −0.137*** [0.023] 0.486 −0.149*** [0.021] 0.528
Solvency ratio
(debt/exports)
−0.010*** [0.001] −2.225 −0.011*** [0.001] −2.445 −0.013*** [0.001] −2.842 −0.013*** [0.001] −2.864 −0.012*** [0.002] −2.732 −0.013*** [0.001] −2.908
Default dummy (20
years)
−1.747*** [0.262] −1.276 −1.937*** [0.250] −1.415 −2.605*** [0.269] −1.903 −2.450*** [0.250] −1.790 −1.852*** [0.325] −1.353 −1.841*** [0.306] −1.345
Reserves ratio 0.085*** [0.011] 1.307 0.081*** [0.011] 1.248 0.051*** [0.011] 0.786 0.047*** [0.010] 0.720 0.096*** [0.020] 1.484 0.075*** [0.017] 1.148
Volatility external flows −266.433*** [53.707] −1.292 −193.274*** [42.454] −0.937 −11.830* [7.029] −0.057 −14.300** [6.883] −0.069 −188.930*** [61.049] −0.916 −157.231*** [46.147] −0.762
EMBI dummy 0.531** [0.234] 0.109 0.689*** [0.230] 0.141 0.279 [0.235] 0.057 0.460** [0.224] 0.094 0.292 [0.296] 0.060 0.452 [0.287] 0.093
Observations 374 398 361 390 284 305
R-squared 0.575 0.597 0.599 0.632 0.535 0.547
Standard errors in brackets.
Note: M.E. refers to the product between sample mean and the coefficient for each variable. Source: Authors’ calculation.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 4b General model – fixed effect estimation with time effect.
S&P Moodys Fitch
(i) (ii) (ii) (iv) (v) (vi)
With remittances ME Without remittances ME With remittances ME Without remittances ME With remittances ME Without remittances ME
GDP per capital (PPP) 0.001*** [0.000] 4.123 0.001*** [0.000] 4.123 0.001*** [0.000] 4.948 0.001*** [0.000] 4.536 0.001*** [0.000] 4.123 0.001*** [0.000] 4.123
GDP growth (annual) −0.025 [0.022] −0.094 −0.03 [0.020] −0.114 −0.054*** [0.018] −0.205 −0.054*** [0.017] −0.203 −0.013 [0.023] −0.048 −0.012 [0.021] −0.045
Annual inflation −0.001** [0.001] −0.063 −0.001** [0.001] −0.058 −0.000 [0.000] −0.015 −0.000 [0.000] −0.015 −0.001 [0.001] −0.053 −0.001 [0.001] −0.049
Fiscal Budget −0.020 [0.033] 0.050 −0.015 [0.029] 0.036 −0.074*** [0.028] 0.181 −0.045* [0.026] 0.111 −0.114** [0.049] 0.279 −0.129*** [0.042] 0.315
Current account
(%GDP)
−0.133*** [0.021] 0.471 −0.137*** [0.018] 0.487 −0.103*** [0.018] 0.365 −0.114*** [0.015] 0.404*** −0.084*** [0.019] 0.298 −0.084*** [0.018] 0.298
Solvency ratio
(debt/exports)
−0.012*** [0.002] −2.666 −0.011*** [0.002] −2.445 −0.008*** [0.001] −1.851 −0.007*** [0.001] −1.586 −0.006** [0.002] −1.234 −0.005*** [0.002] −1.168
Default dummy (20
years)
−1.245*** [0.429] −0.910 −1.158*** [0.408] −0.846 −0.464 [0.364] −0.339 −0.325 [0.358] −0.237 −0.252 [0.614] −0.184 −0.307 [0.587] −0.225
Reserves ratio 0.009 [0.017] 0.140 0.006 [0.014] 0.089 0.033** [0.014] 0.516 0.025** [0.013] 0.383 −0.018 [0.027] −0.271 −0.021 [0.023] −0.329
Volatility external flows −155.712*** [37.605] −0.755 −131.260*** [28.389] −0.637 −7.454* [3.814] −0.036 −8.701** [3.765] −0.042 −173.426*** [42.691] −0.841 −115.077*** [32.876] −0.558
EMBI dummy 0.592** [0.298] 0.121 0.604** [0.259] 0.124 0.068 [0.251] 0.014 0.067 [0.244] 0.014 0.424 [0.421] 0.087 0.352 [0.365] 0.072
Observations 360 398 353 390 273 305
Number of country id 43 47 39 44 41 45
R-squared 0.528 0.535 0.571 0.556 0.455 0.439
Standard errors in brackets.
Note: M.E. refers to the product between sample mean and the coefficient for each variable. Source: Authors’ calculation.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Figure 2 Observed, Predicted and Counterfactual Ratings in 2006.
i
D
w
o
n
W
d
t
e
e
a
3
S
a
c
i
v
2
n
w
n
i
i
c
t
g
c
T
t
t
o
R
t
where Threshold takes the value 1 when the ratio Remittances/GDP
is higher than a given percentage and zero otherwise. Thresh-
old × TDX and Threshold × Volat indicator are the interaction
effects between countries with a high share of remittances and the
13 These results are not reported but they can be provided upon request.
14 Note that this dummy is non constant over time, and therefore can be
included in the fixed-effect panel.
15 We test other configurations to take into account the importance of isolat-
ing those ratings most likely to be affected by remittance flows. We includeNote: Unity is equivalent to one notch.
Source: Authors based on of Fitch Ratings (2008b), Moody’s Investors
Service (2008b) and Standard and Poor’s (2007).
the counterfactual rating, showing that by including remittances,
estimated ratings can improve for these countries. For the case of
El Salvador, estimated rating can improve close to one notch when
remittances are included. However, a question remains: are CRAs
already including remittances in their own models? By comparing
the counterfactual rating and the observed rating, these ratings do not
change considerably for countries with high levels of remittances
over GDP. Indeed, for other countries, like Uruguay or Venezuela,
changes are substantially more important. Moreover, for the set of
countries with high levels of remittances, it is not always the case
that the observed rating is below the counterfactual rating (posi-
tive sign in the figure). For the case of El Salvador and Guatemala,
observed ratings are above the counterfactual rating, meaning that
Standard and Poor’s ratings are more favourable than those yielded
t
s
l
i
t65
n a model including remittances. By contrast, for Ecuador and
ominican Republic, the opposite happens: for Standard and Poor’s,
e obtain a higher rating in the model with remittances than the
bserved ratings.
Including the debt to exports ratio and the volatility of exter-
al flows in the estimation does not substantially alter the results.
e infer that including remittances in the rating agencies’ model
oes not improve most Latin American countries’ ratings. To check
he robustness of this result, we test the opposite estimation, using
quation II and calculating the counterfactual with the variables
xcluding remittances (TDX wr and Volat indicator wr). With this
pproach results remain unchanged.13
.5. Model for remittance-dependent countries
overeign ratings are the output of a qualitative and quantitative
nalysis of credit risk. They are generally assigned on a case-by-
ase basis. This is in line with previous research showing that there
s not a single model to rate countries, which implies that not all
ariables have the same impact on ratings (Roubini and Manasse,
005).
In that context, the wide range of countries in the sample does
ot permit to fully isolate the impact of remittances. Initially, we
ould expect that for those countries where remittances have a non-
egligible weight in the economy (as a share of GDP), the change
n our two benchmark variables (i.e., solvency ratio and volatility
ndicator) including and excluding remittances would be signifi-
ant. We calculate a threshold variable (for each country and year)
aking the value 1 when the ratio Remittances/GDP is higher than a
iven threshold and zero otherwise. The objective is to identify those
ountries and years where the relative level of remittances is high.14
hen, we calculate a crossed term with the non-constant dummy and
he variables TDX and Volat indicator, that will detect the interac-
ion effect between countries with a high share of remittances and
ur variable of interest.15
Thus, we test the following model for the whole sample:
atingi,t = β0 + β1GDP pc + β2GDP growthi,t + β3Inflati,t
+β4Fisc budgi,t + β5CAi,t + β6TDXi,t + β7Defaulti,
+β8Reservesi,t + β9Volat indicatori,t + β10EMBIi,t
+β11Threshold × TDX + β12Threshold
×Volat indicatori,t + β13Threshold + τt
+ νi + εi,t (III)he remittances to GDP ratio as an explanatory variable, but this is not
ignificant for the sample. Also, we split the sample into different groups, fol-
owing the World Bank classification (lower income/middle income/higher
ncome, etc.) and performed regressions on each group. Finally, we opt for
he non-constant dummy variable.
6 R. Avendano et al.
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ively.
Table 5 summarizes the results for a fixed effect with time effect
odel and using two different thresholds: 3.5 and 5.0 per cent,
espectively.16
Regressions in Table 5 allow isolating the effect that remittances
an have for those countries where they are more important. With
he 3.5 per cent threshold, the solvency ratio and the volatility of
xternal flows are negative and significant.17 The threshold dummy
ariable is significant for two agencies. The interactive term for the
olatility of external flows, also, is positive and significant; while the
nteractive term of the solvency ratio is not significant. Increasing
he threshold to 5 per cent does have a significant and positive effect
n the threshold dummy variable for S&P only. It does affect the
nteractive term of the volatility of external flows, with a positive
nd significant effect on the sovereign rating (S&P and Moody’s).
gain, the interactive term of the solvency ratio is not significant.18
This result suggests that for remittance-dependent countries,
igh remittances do not have necessarily a direct effect on ratings
the dummy variable remittances over GDP is significant for some
gencies and dependent on the threshold used). If a country is highly
ependent on remittances, this does not automatically mean that
arkets’ perception about this country is going to improve.
However, the solvency ratio and the external flows volatility vari-
ble (by including remittances) are significant for most of the CRAs.
oreover, the interaction term between the remittances to GDP ratio
nd the flows volatility is significant to explain ratings, denoting that
he negative impact of the volatility of external flows on ratings is
educed. In other words, remittances have above all an indirect and
ositive impact on ratings through a premium (captured with the
nteractive dummy variable remittances over GDP and the volatility
f external flows). Indeed, there is an insight. The indirect impact of
emittances on ratings goes mainly through the volatility of exter-
al flows (and not through the solvency ratio, as argued in previous
esearch on sovereign ratings and remittances).
For countries where the remittances to GDP ratio is higher than 5
er cent, the elasticity of the rating with respect to the external flows
ariable is β9 +β12. Since β12 is positive, the weight of the external
ows variable is reduced. We find that including an interaction term
etween the remittances to GDP ratio and the external flows variable
enotes a more inelastic rating for those countries where precisely
emittances are more important. For countries with high remittances
o GDP ratio, there is an indirect effect of remittances. Besides, the
egative impact of the volatility of external flows on their ratings
an be attenuated. In any case, as it is depicted in Annex 4, the effect
s somehow limited.
Results support the view that CRAs do take remittance flows into
ccount to rate sovereigns. This variable turns out to be significant
or a limited set of countries, specifically those that are small in size
nd classified in the low and middle income categories. A favourable
rend of remittances can improve ratings but the reverse scenario also
pplies. Such findings explain why in the recent economic crisis,
16 We also estimate this model by running a pooled regression and obtain
imilar results.
17 The exception is the solvency ratio variable for Fitch estimation.
18 For the threshold model, we also estimate correlations between fixed
ffects and country ratings. The correlations are −0.01, 0.24 and 0.28 for
&P, Fitch and Moody’s, respectively. These low correlations support the
act that estimation and prediction do not depend solely on the countries’
xed effect.
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Table 6 Shadow and potential ratings by CRA and by country.
“Shadow ratings” “Potential ratings”
S&P Moody’s Fitch S&P Moody’s Fitch
Argentina NA NA 1993:1997 1993:2006 1993:2006 1997:2006
Bolivia 1993:1997 1993:1997 1993:2003 1998:2006 1998:2006 2004:2006
Brazil 1993 NA 1993 1994:2005 1993:2005 1994:2005
Chile NA 1993:1998 1993:1995 1993:2006 1999:2006 1996:2006
Colombia NA NA 1993 1993:2006 1993:2006 1994:2006
Costa Rica 1995:1996 1995:1996 1995:1997 1997:2006 1997:2006 1998:2006
Dominican Rep. 1995:1996 1995:1998 1995:2002 1997:2006 1999:2006 2003:2006
Ecuador 1993:1999 1993:1996 1993:2001 2000:2006 1997:2006 2002:2006
El Salvador 1993:1995 1993:2001 1993:1995 1996:2006 2002:2006 1996:2006
Guatemala 1993:2000 1993:1996 1993:2005 2001:2006 1997:2006 2006
Honduras 1993:2006 1993:1998 1993:2006 NA 1999:2006 NA
Mexico NA NA 1993:1995 1993:2006 1993:2006 1995:2006
Nicaragua 2002:2006 NA 2002:2006 NA 2002:2006 NA
Panama 1994:1996 1994:1996 1994:1997 1997:2006 1997:2006 1998:2006
Paraguay NA 1995:1997 1995:2006 1995:2006 1998:2006 NA
Peru 1993:1996 1993:1998 1993:1998 1997:2006 1999:2006 1999:2006
Uruguay NA NA NA 2002:2006 2002:2006 2002:2006
NA
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specific agency for a given year.
In Annex 2, “shadow” and “potential” ratings are calculated for
the general model.23 As we noted before, CRAs do not have a unique
model to assign ratings. Therefore, we calculate as well “shadow rat-Venezuela NA NA
Note: This table presets the periods covering shadow ratings for the gene
countries are exhibited in Annex 3. Source: The authors based on Fitch R
five out of the seven rated countries with the highest remittances to
GDP ratios in the Latin American and Caribbean region have been
downgraded or have faced a worsening of their rating outlook (from
positive to stable or from stable to negative).19
However, the impact of including remittances in both the sol-
vency ratio and the external flows volatility ratio remains weak with
respect to other fundamental variables that affect ratings. This sug-
gests that other factors, such as the reduction of debt service, the
lowering of the foreign currency debt and the deepening of local
currency financial markets may be more relevant to explain ratings.
3.6. Shadow ratings for unrated countries
The credit rating issued by major international rating agencies is a
key aspect affecting a sovereign’s access to capital markets. Even
if sovereign bonds do not always need ratings to be placed in the
international capital markets, it is common practice to have them
rated, given the necessity of institutional investors to have a bench-
mark for credit risk. Indeed, while their participation is not strictly
needed in a legal sense, domestic or international prudential regu-
lations, which rely on ratings and place limits on the purchase of
unrated securities, make them necessary in practice.20 This is rele-
vant today since other capital markets’ signals about credit risk that
existed in the past are no longer valid today (Flandreau et al., 2010).Moreover, sovereign ratings generate externalities. First, they
might help to draw more investors’ attention and therefore attract
more capital flows. Sovereign ratings can be considered a bench-
mark for investors’ decisions in private bond and equity markets
19 Between September 2008 and June 2010, Jamaica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Ecuador were downgraded and/or
their outlooks worsened. The two countries with stable ratings were Hon-
duras and Nicaragua. Guyana and Haiti were not taken into account given
they did not have ratings.
20 Moreover, the Basel II regulatory framework could penalize unrated
securities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005).
M
b
r
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R
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F
P
a2003:2006 2003:2006 2003:2006
odel. Periods covering Shadow ratings for unrated and highly dependent
(2008b), Moody’s Investors Service (2008b) and S&P (2007).
s well as in foreign direct investment. Second, sovereign ratings
re often the ceiling for sub-sovereign as well as corporate foreign
urrency ratings.
Somewhat surprisingly, given the benefits of a rating, a large
umber of developing countries remain unrated today. High fixed
osts, lack of information and of incentives may be responsible for
his. According to Ratha et al. (2007), “70 developing countries –
ostly poor – and 12 high-income countries do not have a rating
rom a major rating agency. Of the 86 developing countries that
ave been rated, the rating was established in 2004 or earlier for 15
ountries”. Similar results are observed for investment-bank reports
n developing and emerging economies.21
What would be the “shadow ratings” for unrated Latin Ameri-
an and Caribbean countries? Table 6 presents two series of periods
overing shadow and potential ratings respectively for each coun-
ry and agency.22 The naming “shadow ratings” concerns unrated
ountries for a given year and a specific agency, while “potential
atings” refer to countries that were already assigned a rating by a21 Leading emerging-market benchmarks like the EMBI produced by JP
organ for the bond markets or country coverage by leading investment
anks like Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JP Morgan or Morgan Stanley,
arely cover or sample more than 35 economies. The other 120 developing
ountries simply do not exist for global financial-market investors. Only 10
ountries enjoyed systematic coverage from the major financial institutions.
22 Shadow ratings were reassessed including the fixed effect indepen-
ently. The reassessed ratings for S&P were: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican
epublic, Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala. For Moody’s: Bolivia, Chile,
osta Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Peru.
or Fitch: Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua and
anama.
23 More precisely, “shadow” and “potential” ratings are considered equally
s “predicted ratings” and compared with the counterfactual ratings.
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ngs” for unrated and highly dependent countries from the model
xposed in equation III (see Annex 4). In particular, shadow rat-
ngs are estimated for Latin American and Caribbean countries
hich are highly dependent on remittances (i.e., Honduras, El Sal-
ador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Dominican Republic and Ecuador)
ccording to a specific model. Shadow ratings differ among rating
gencies. For instance, the shadow ratings of Fitch for Honduras
nd Nicaragua are B− and CCC+ respectively, while the shadow
atings of S&P for these both countries are B.
. Conclusion
his paper analyses the impact of remittance flows on sovereign
atings for developing and emerging countries over the period
993–2006. In order to capture the impact of remittances on
overeign risk, we focus on two core variables. We test a tradi-
ional solvency ratio, already used in the literature and we introduce
nother determinant, the volatility of external flows.
First, using a model of the determinants of sovereign ratings
nd then a counterfactual estimation, we find that the impact of
ncluding remittances in both the solvency ratio and the external
ows volatility on ratings is modest. This suggests that other factors,
uch as the reduction of debt service, the lowering of the foreign
urrency debt and the deepening of local currency financial markets
ay be more relevant to explain ratings.
Second, there is no single model to rate countries and variables
ighlighted by agencies do not have the same impact on sovereign
atings. In that context we estimate a specific model for countries
J
t
AR. Avendano et al.
ith relatively high levels of remittances. Our results support the
iew that remittance flows have an influence on small low and middle
ncome Central American and Caribbean countries. This impact of
emittances depends more on the volatility of external flows than on
he solvency ratio (debt over exports). Nevertheless, the recent wave
f downgrades of several remittance-dependent countries due to the
rop in remittances suggests that those have procyclical effects in
imes of market turmoil (five out of the seven rated countries with
he highest remittances to GDP ratios were downgraded or faced
worsening of their rating outlook between September 2008 and
une 2010).
Third, this research also provides shadow ratings for countries
hich are not rated by the three main CRAs, in particular some Cen-
ral American and Caribbean countries, where relative remittance
ows are high. Our analysis provides information on the potential
atings of these countries, thus indicating their creditworthiness to
nternational investors.
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Annex 1a Determinants of sovereign ratings (1993–2006).
Cantor and Packer (1996) Rowland and Torres (2004)
S&P Moodys Fitch S&P Moodys Fitch
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances 1 With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances
gdp per cap ppp curr 0.001** [12.59] 0.001** [12.44] 0.001** [15.38] 0.001** [15.23] 0.001*** [10.58] 0.001** [10.58]
gdp growth annual −0.073** [3.61] −0.072*** [3.55] −0.052*** [3.20] −0.051*** [3.13] −0.047** [2.27] −0.047** [2.28] −0.009 [0.40] −0.009 [0.40] −0.002 [0.12] −0.003 [0.15] −0.047** [2.30] −0.048** [2.36]
inflat annual −0.001* [1.92] −0.001* [1.88] −0.000 [0.91] −0.000 [0.93] −0.001 [1.25] −0.001 [1.23] −0.001 [1.60] −0.001 [1.60] −0.001** [1.98] −0.001* [1.96] −0.000 [0.41] −0.000 [0.44]
fisc budget our 0.018 [0.66] 0.019 [0.69] −0.043* [1.81] −0.041* [1.75] −0.116*** [3.22] −0.114*** [3.19]
current account bal %gdp−0.154*** [8.75] −0.153*** [8.64] −0.111*** [7.77] −0.110*** [7.69] −0.077*** [4.53] −0.078*** [4.58]
tdoverx −0.013*** [7.58] −0.012*** [7.18] −0.009*** [6.25] −0.008*** [5.86] −0.007*** [3.66] −0.006*** [3.56] 0.009*** [3.20] 0.009*** [3.62] 0.007*** [2.66] 0.007*** [2.75] 0.018*** [6.11] 0.016*** [6.08]
default 20 −0.878** [2.27] −0.787** [2.03] −0.368 [1.14] −0.308 [0.95] 0.010 [0.02] 0.075 [0.15] −2.309*** [5.32] −2.379*** [5.50] −1.333*** [3.19] −1.370*** [3.29] −0.349 [0.67] −0.510 [0.97]
tdovergnp −0.058*** [7.68] −0.060*** [7.99] −0.038*** [5.70] −0.039*** [5.75] −0.073*** [9.70] −0.073*** [9.68]
tdtdsovergnp 0.049* [1.86] 0.048* [1.82] 0.037 [1.56] 0.039 [1.64] 0.038 [1.45] 0.043 [1.64]
res gnp 0.037** [2.38] 0.038** [2.45] 0.054*** [3.77] 0.055*** [3.84] 0.060*** [3.05] 0.061*** [3.14]
openness 0.002 [0.31] 0.003 [0.45] −0.005 [0.66] −0.004 [0.64] 0.018** [2.19] 0.017** [2.10]
log res
log bank res to bank assets
log tdtdsoverx
log tdovergnp
Observations 427 428 417 418 334 335 497 497 477 477 363 363
Number of country id 49 49 46 46 47 47 55 55 49 49 50 50
R-squared 0.53 0.52 0.57 0.56 0.45 0.45 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.33 0.33
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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Annex 1b Determinants of sovereign ratings (1993–2006).
Sutton (2005)
S&P Moody’s Fitch
(xiii) (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xvii)
With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances
gdp per cap ppp curr
gdp growth annual
inflat annual
fisc budget our
current account bal %gdp
tdoverx
default 20 −2.228*** [5.64] −2.260*** [5.73] −1.275*** [3.43] −1.313*** [3.53] −0.389 [0.81] −0.423 [0.88]
tdovergnp
tdtdsovergnp
res gnp
openness
log res 1.845*** [9.72] 1.838*** [9.69] 1.658*** [10.46] 1.651*** [10.39] 1.909*** [9.06] 1.905*** [9.03]
log bank res to bank assets −0.887*** [5.33] −0.879*** [5.27] −0.637*** [4.48] −0.634*** [4.44] −0.925*** [4.65] −0.921*** [4.61]
log tdtdsoverx 0.816*** [4.07] 0.823*** [4.13] 0.946*** [5.23] 0.906*** [4.98] 0.720*** [3.45] 0.717*** [3.42]
log tdovergnp −1.767*** [6.43] −1.780*** [6.46] −1.380*** [5.74] −1.359*** [5.63] −1.754*** [6.46] −1.752*** [6.33]
Observations 488 488 479 479 361 361
Number of country id 55 55 50 50 49 49
R-squared 0.4 0.4 0.38 0.37 0.42 0.42
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Annex 1c Determinants of sovereign ratings (1993–2006).
Mora (2006) – level variable Mora (2006) – lagged variable
S&P Moodys Fitch S&P Moodys Fitch
(i) (ii) (Iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances With remittances Without remittances
gdp per cap ppp curr 0.001*** [10.34] 0.001*** [10.37] 0.001*** [14.06] 0.001*** [14.18] 0.001*** [6.52] 0.001*** [6.50] 0.001 [1.18] 0.000 [2.43] 0.000*** [2.99] 0.001 [0.65] 0.002 [4.68] 0.000 [2.43]
gdp growth annual −0.088*** [4.57] −0.087*** [4.55] −0.074*** [4.40] −0.075*** [4.46] −0.057** [2.54] −0.059** [2.60] 0.109*** [5.11] 0.110*** [5.17] 0.000 [1.97] 0.068*** [3.01] 0.000 [0.76] −0.348 [4.72]
inflat annual −0.001 [0.18] −0.001 [0.15] −0.000 [0.62] −0.000 [0.62] −0.003 [0.32] −0.004 [0.37] −0.008 [1.06] −0.008 [1.06] 0.001 [1.89] 0.000 [2.15] 0.001 [0.52] 0.086*** [1.89]
fisc budget our 0.035 [1.22] 0.036 [1.24] −0.064** [2.54] −0.065** [2.58] −0.014 [0.35] −0.016 [0.39] 0.020 [0.62] 0.021 [0.64] 10.078** [2.54] 0.054 [0.15] 0.078** [0.10] 0.001 [0.94]
current account bal %gdp−0.093*** [4.96] −0.093*** [4.95] −0.079*** [4.67] −0.080*** [4.74] −0.071*** [3.02] −0.071*** [3.03] 0.055*** [2.64] 0.055*** [2.66] 0.021 [1.44] 0.027 [1.45] 0.027 [1.44] 0.027 [1.45]
tdoverx −0.004* [1.87] −0.004* [1.87] −0.004** [2.07] −0.004** [2.40] 0.004 [1.60] 0.003 [1.60] −0.004* [1.67] −0.004 [1.60] 0.046** [1.06] 0.046** [1.43] −0.366 [1.06] −0.002 [0.13]
default 20 −0.462 [0.93] −0.434 [0.87] −0.135 [0.31] −0.109 [0.26] 0.441 [0.31] 0.411 [0.68] 0.4 [0.15] 0.110 [0.20] 0.068*** [0.52] 0.000*** [4.78] 0.085*** [2.40] 0.078** [0.52]
spread −0.001*** [8.38] −0.001*** [8.41] −0.000*** [3.30] −0.000*** [3.19] −0.001*** [7.62] −0.001*** [7.54] 0.000*** [3.29] 0.000*** [3.26] 0.026 [2.15] −0.003** [2.01] 0.003* [1.94] 0.000* [0.72]
Observations 225 226 229 230 194 195 225 226 229 230 194 195
Number of country id 27 28 27 28 25 26 27 28 27 28 25 26
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.37
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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Annex 3 Periods covering shadow ratings for remittance-dependent countries.
S&P Moddy’s Fitch
Bolivia 1993:1997 1993:1997 1993:2003
Chile 1993:1998
Costa Rica 1995:1996 1995:1996
Dominican Rep. 1995:1996 1995:1998 1995:2002
Ecuador 1995:2001
El Salvador 1993:1995
Guatemala 1993:2000 1993:2005
Honduras 1993:2006 1993:1998 1993:2006
Nicaragua 2002:2006 2002:2006
Paraguay 1995:2006
Peru 1993:1998
Source: Authors based on Fitch Ratings (2008b), Moody’s Investors Service (2008b) and S&P (2007).
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Annex 4a Predicted vs. observed analysis for Latin America – S&P. Model for high remittance-receptors and shadow ratings for unrated countries.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Annex 4b Predicted vs. observed analysis for Latin America – Moody’s. Model for high remittance-receptors and shadow ratings for unrated
countries.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Annex 4c Predicted vs. observed analysis for Latin America – Fitch. M
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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